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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880488-CA 
v : 
AHAB MUSTAPHA ALY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of exploiting 
prostitution in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1)(b) 
(1978), a third degree felony, following a jury trial in Third 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable Leonard 
H. Russon, judge, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction of this 
appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court's refusal to give 
defendant's requested jury instruction, No. 13, which limited the 
introduction of the State's witness' prior felony conviction to 
being considered for purposes of credibility only, was reversible 
error. 
2. Whether the trial court improperly limited defense 
counsel's closing argument by preventing defense counsel from 
arguing that the prosecution's failure to call a witness that may 
have corroborated the State's witness served to cast doubt on the 
State's case. 
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of exploiting prostitution. 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305 (1978). Exploiting 
prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting 
prostitution if he: 
(b) Encourages, induces, or otherwise 
purposely causes another to become or remain 
a prostitute . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a) t 
General rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
Utah R. Evid. 403; 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudiceir 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ahab Mustapha Aly, was charged with 
exploiting prostitution in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-
1305 (1978). He was convicted as charged following a jury trial. 
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The trial court stayed the statutory term of imprisonment of zero 
to five years and placed defendant on probation for eighteen 
months; he was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and serve ten days in 
the Salt Lake County Jail with work release. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In August 1987, Carmen Dena Finken was unemployed and 
looking for work (T. A-15). She located a help wanted ad in a 
newspaper that advertised a position as an escort at which she 
could make $45 an hour (T. A-15). She called and made an 
appointment to go in the next day, at which time she met with 
defendant, Ahab Aly (T. A-16). Defendant filled her in on the 
job requirements, which included meeting with men for an hour as 
she modeled lingerie and swimwear; she was informed that the 
escorts must obey laws and refrain from touching private areas, 
which were defined as anything covered by a swimsuit (T. A-17). 
Ms. Finken was informed that she would earn $45 an hour (T. A-
17). Ms. Finken did not anticipate having to engage in sexual 
behavior with the clients; in fact, defendant told her 
specifically that she would not have to (T. A-36). Later she was 
informed that there were certain customers for whom she was 
expected to do anything they wanted (T. A-36). 
When Ms. Finken initially got the job, she stayed with 
defendant at his home (T. A-25). She had been living in Layton 
The transcript of this case is coontained in one volume that is 
separated into three parts. The pages in each part begin with 
page number 1. The transcript cites herein will refer to the 
June 2nd transcript as MA," the June 3rd transcript as "B#M and 
the July 18th transcript as ,,C.,, The page number will then 
follow the part designation, e.g., M(T. A-l)" for June 2 
transcript at page 1. 
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and had no transportation to Salt Lake City (T. A-25). She 
engaged in sex with defendant; initially she did so voluntarily 
but also stated that defendant told her she was expected to sleep 
with him (T. A-25). 
Ms. Finken detailed four incidents in which she met 
with men. On the first "date," she went to an office building 
downtown where she met with a businessman (T. A-18). He removed 
his clothes and asked her to model the lingerie (T. A-18). The 
man began to masturbate and then asked her to masturbate him; she 
refused, saying it was against the law, but he grabbed her hand 
and forced her (T. A-19). She was paid $100 and turned the money 
over to defendant (T. A-22). Ms. Finken related what had 
happened, and defendant said that it was "expected" of any escort 
who saw this client (T. A-22-23). Defendant informed her that 
there were customers who were "special" and that certain favors 
were expected (T. A-23-24). He also warned her several times to 
make sure the customers were not cops (T. A-24). 
On a second date a few days later, Ms. Finken met a man 
at a motel who was wearing only underwear. She modeled the 
lingerie while the client masturbated (T. A-26). He had her lay 
on the bed with him while he rubbed his penis between her legs 
until he ejaculated (T. A-26). She was paid $100; defendant got 
$55 and she kept $45 (T. A-29). She later told defendant that 
the man was disgusting, to which defendant replied, MWell# that 
is something you just have to put up with" because he was a 
"special customer" (T. A-28). 
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On a third date, Ms. Finken met a man at the Roadrunner 
Motel. The client, who was initially in a wheelchair, lay on the 
bed with her as kissed and hugged her and rubbed his penis 
against her (T. A-30). He extended her stay an additional hour 
and paid her by check (T. A-29-30). When she returned, she told 
defendant he was just like everyone else, to which defendant 
replied that the situation was not unusual (T. A-31-32). 
Prior to a fourth date a few days later, defendant told 
Ms. Finken that the client was a good friend and was "special" 
and that she was to do whatever he wanted (T. A-33). Defendant 
dropped her off at the client's house in the avenues area. The 
man was intoxicated and wearing a bathrobe (T. A-34). She 
modeled the lingerie, laid on the bed with him, and they hugged 
and kissed (T. A-34). After the hour visit, defendant picked her 
up and took her back to his place (T. A-34). Defendant kept the 
entire $100 she was paid, saying that he was keeping her share to 
pay for part of her escort license (T. A-35). 
On cross-examination, Ms. Finken stated that she had 
been convicted of felony distribution of a controlled substance 
in August 1986 (T. 39). She had been placed on probation; she 
was found to be in violation of her probation as a result of 
working for defendant as an escort as well as for non-payment of 
a fine (T. A-36-37). 
Ms. Finken was cross-examined about the details of a 
statement she had been a detective in October 1987 (R. A-46). 
Some of the statements were different than her trial testimony; 
she had told the detective that she had not complained to 
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defendant about the clients' conduct because complaints to 
defendant were strictly taboo (T. A-58). Also, she only gave 
details about the first date and told the detective there had 
been no other sexual activity (T. A-63). She explained that 
since her statement to the detective, she had had a chance to 
reflect on the incident and reiterated that she had complained to 
defendant about each incident (T. A-64). She also explained that 
she had interpreted sexual activity to be limited to sexual 
intercourse (T. A-65). 
Defendant did not testify or present evidence at trial 
(T. A-70). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that the 
State's witnesses' credibility could be impeached as the result 
of a prior conviction was not error, as the jury was free to 
consider the prior conviction for any purpose—not just 
credibility—and the jury was instructed generally about 
determining the credibility of witnesses. 
Defendant failed to establish that a potential witness 
was peculiarly within the power of the State to produce as a 
witness or that her testimony would elucidate the issues at 
trial, and was, therefore, not entitled to argue the missing 
witness inference. 
The evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's 




THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S 
INSTRUCTION REGARDING THE CREDIBILITY OF A 
WITNESS WHO HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF 
A FELONY WAS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Defendant contends that Utah R. Evid 609(a) does not 
afford the same protection to government witnesses as it does to 
a defendant and defense witnesses, and that, therefore, the 
State's witnesses, Ms. Finken, was subject to impeachment as the 
result of her prior conviction for felony distribution of a 
controlled substance. Although Ms. Finken testified on cross-
examination that she had been convicted of this felony, thus 
putting the evidence before the jury, defendant claims it was 
reversible error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the 
jury that their consideration of the conviction was limited to 
its effect on the credibility of Ms. Finken. 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a) states: 
General rule. For the purpose of attacking 
the credibility of a witness, evidence that 
he has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if elicited from him or established 
by public record during cross-examination but 
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death 
or imprisonment in excess of one year under 
the law under which he was convicted, and the 
court determines that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) 
involved dishonesty or false statement, 
regardless of the punishment. 
During cross-examination, Ms. Finken admitted that she 
had been previously convicted for felony distribution of a 
controlled substance in Davis County in August 1986 (T A-39). 
Consequently, the jury was informed of Ms. Finken's prior 
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criminal conviction. Defendant contends that Rule 609(a) permits 
the use of prior felony convictions to impeach a State's witness 
in all criminal cases, and that the balancing test contained in 
subsection (a)(1) applies only when determining the prejudicial 
effect to the defendant. 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court has 
considered whether Rule 609(a) affords no protection to State's 
witnesses in criminal cases, which would allow unfettered use of 
prior convictions regardless of the probative value to the 
witnesses' credibility or the remoteness in time that the 
conviction was entered. Therefore, the issue has yet to be 
resolved in this jurisdiction. 
As defendant correctly points out, in State v. Banner, 
717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the 
rules of evidence adopted in 1983 were to provide a fresh 
starting place for the law of evidence and that the courts should 
look to the federal rules for guidance in construing the new 
rules. It appears that the majority position in the federal 
courts is that the process of weighing the probative value of 
evidence of a prior conviction against the prejudicial effect "to 
the defendant," places no limitation upon cross-examination of 
government witnesses because of possible prejudicial effect to 
them. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 
1977); United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977), 
cert, denied, 444 U.S. 847 (19 ); United States v. Thorne, 547 
F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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Other jurisdictions have not followed this position. 
For example, in People v. Woodard, 590 P.2d 391, 396 (Cal. 1979), 
the California Supreme Court held that a trial court must weigh 
appropriate factors to determine whether the probative value of a 
prior conviction for purposes of credibility is outweighed by the 
risk of undue prejudice. The court noted that "'[i]t would be 
anomalous to hold that a trial judge has no discretion to exclude 
evidence that a witness, other than a defendant in a criminal 
action, was convicted of a felony even though the felony was, for 
example, an aggravated assault committed many years earlier when 
the witness was young and immature.'" (Citations omitted. 
To allow otherwise could lead to an unsettling result 
in a number of situations. For example, there may be cases in 
which the case hinges on the credibility of a defendant weighed 
against the credibility of a state's witness. If a defendant who 
has numerous convictions chooses to testify, but none of the 
convictions are admissible when analyzing the probative value 
against prejudicial effect as affecting credibility, the 
defendant will appear more credible than a government witness who 
may have had one prior conviction for a relatively minor offense. 
This would lead the jury to underestimate the credibility of the 
state's witness when juxtaposed to the defendant's credibility 
because of incomplete or distorted information. 
Regardless, the issue in this case is not whether Ms. 
Finken's prior conviction was admissible—the evidence was 
admitted in this case. The jury was informed that she had been 
previously convicted of felony distribution of a controlled 
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substance. The issue here is whether the jury should have been 
given defendant's proposed instruction No. 13. The proposed 
instruction states: 
The testimony of a witness may be 
discredited or impeached by showing that the 
witness has been convicted of a felony, that 
is, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for 
a term of years. Prior conviction does not 
render a witness incompetent to testify, but 
is merely a circumstance which you may 
consider in determining the credibility of 
the witness. It is the province of the jury 
to determine the weight to be given to any 
prior conviction as impeachment. 
(R. 61.) 
The requested instruction is essentially a limiting or 
cautionary instruction, which informs the jury that the prior 
conviction should be considered only for purposes of a witness' 
credibility. Failure to give the instruction did not prejudice 
defendant because, absent the instruction, the jury was allowed 
to consider the prior conviction for any purpose. For example, 
the jury was free to infer that Ms. Finken was a person of bad 
character or morals as the result of her prior conviction. 
The trial court ruled that Ms. Finken's prior 
conviction was not admissible. His ruling was apparently based 
on Utah R. Evid 609(a), as he stated that the majority position 
is that the crime of distribution of a controlled substance is 
not a crime involving the honesty of a witness (T. B-2-3). The 
court stated that had the State objected at the time the evidence 
was admitted, he would have sustained the objection (T. B-2). 
Apparently, the court found that the conviction for distribution 
of a controlled substance did not weigh heavily on the 
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credibility of Ms. Finken. Even if the evidence could have been 
admitted under Rule 609(a), the trial court was free to find the 
evidence inadmissible under Utah R. Evid. 403. See United States 
v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976). Rule 403 states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Even if evidence is proper impeachment evidence, it can 
be excluded because its potential for prejudice outweighs its 
probative value under some circumstances. See State v. Rammell, 
721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). A trial court's determination of such 
an issue will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court so 
abused its discretion that there was a substantial likelihood of 
an unjust result. See State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 
1982) . 
Further, failure to give the instruction did not 
prejudice defendant as the jury was instructed in instructions 
No. 9 and 9 as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Where there is a conflict in the 
evidence you should reconcile such conflict 
as far as you reasonably can. . . . You are 
not bound to believe all that the witnesses 
have testified to or any witness or class of 
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable 
and convincing in view of all of the facts 
and circumstances in evidence. . . . The 
testimony of a witness known to have made 
false statements on one matter is naturally 
less convincing on other matters. So if you 
believe a witness has wilfully testified 
falsely as to any material fact in this case, 
you may disregard the whole of the testimony 
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of such witness, or you may give it such 
weight as you think it is entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
You are the exclusive judges of the 
credibility of the witness and the weight of 
the evidence. In judging the weight of the 
testimony and credibility of the witnesses 
you have a right to take into consideration 
their bias, their interest in the result of 
the suit, or any probable motive or lack 
thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown. 
You may consider the witnesses' deportment 
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of 
their statements, their apparent frankness or 
candor, or the want of it, their opportunity 
to know, their ability to understand, and 
their capacity to remember. You should 
consider these matters together with all of 
the other facts and circumstances which you 
may believe have a bearing on the 
truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' 
statement. 
Given that the jury was instructed on how it should 
determine the credibility of witnesses and specifically informed 
that it could consider enumerated items as well as "any other 
facts and circumstances which you may believe have a bearing on 
the truthfulness" of a witnesses' testimony, the jury was 
adequately informed on this issue and it was not error for the 
trial court to refuse to give defendant's requested instruction 
No. 13. Jury instructions must be considered as a whole. State 
v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984). Whether to give 
instructions is generally left to the discretion of the trial 
court, and it is not error to refuse an instruction if its 
content is set out in other instructions. State v. Reedy, 681 
P.2d 1251 (Utah 1984) . 
Finally, it appears that defendant's requested 
instruction was not timely. According to the judge's hand 
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written note on instruction No. 13, the instruction was received 
on the last day of trial (R. 61). An instruction that is not 
timely submitted need not be given. State v. Evans, 668 P.2d 566 
(Utah 1983) . 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT A 
POTENTIAL WITNESS WAS PECULIARLY WITHIN THE 
POWER OF THE STATE TO PRODUCE AND, THEREFORE, 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO ARGUE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 
THAT THE FAILURE OF THE STATE TO CALL THIS 
WITNESS CAST DOUBT ON THE STATE'S CASE. 
Defendant contends that it was reversible error for the 
trial court to restrict his closing argument and prevent him from 
arguing that the State's failure to call Sheri Mitchell as a 
corroborating witness raised doubt as to its case. Defendant 
contends that there was one conversation between Ms. Finken and 
defendant during which Sheri Mitchell was present, and that Ms. 
Finken made statements during the conversation that were 
inconsistent with her statement to the investigating detective. 
Specifically, Ms. Finken testified about having informed 
defendant after her first date that a client had requested sexual 
favors, and that she did so in the presence of Sheri Mitchell, 
but then told the detective during an interview that she did not 
inform defendant that the clients had expected sex. 
To prevail on this argument, defendant must show that 
the witness, Sheri Mitchell, was peculiarly within the power of 
the State to produce. Defendant must have demonstrate that the 
witness was "physically available only to the opponent, or that 
the witness has the type of relationship with the opposing party 
that pragmatically renders his testimony unavailable to the 
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opposing party. State v. Smith, 706 P.2d 1052 (Utah 1985). In 
Smith, the Utah Supreme Court recognized the "missing witness" 
inference, stating that the concept: 
has been judicially recognized for over a 
century and has been summarized as follows: 
"If a party has it peculiarly within his 
power to produce witnesses whose testimony 
would elucidate the transaction, the fact 
that he does not do it permits an inference 
that the testimony, if produced, would have 
been unfavorable." 
Id. at 1057. (Citations omitted.) In Smith the record did not 
demonstrate that the "missing witnesses" were peculiarly within 
the power of the state to produce as witnesses. They were not 
involved in the case, and the defendant "elicited no shread of 
evidence to prove that their testimony was unavailable" to him. 
Id. at 1058. The Court held that the defendant's argument was 
properly limited because the conditions necessary for the comment 
were lacking. 
In the present case, the conditions necessary for 
comment on Ms. Mitchell's absence are similarly lacking. 
Defendant was aware that Ms. Finken had a roommate and was even 
aware of her first name (T. B-4). He claimed, however, that he 
did not have access to her or know where or who she was (T. B-4). 
The prosecutor stated that had defense counsel asked, the State 
would have made Ms. Finken or the witness available to him (T. B-
4). Although arrangements could have been made after the first 
day of trial, when this allegedly important information came to 
light, defense counsel made no request for more information about 
the witness, and did not move for a continuance to allow time to 
obtain further information. 
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Defendant did not show that the witness was peculiarly 
within the power of the State to produce as a witness, or that 
her testimony would have been elucidating. Had defendant in fact 
desired the testimony of Ms. Mitchell, he could have made a 
request for more information and she would have been made 
available. Further, it is just as likely as not that the 
testimony of Ms. Mitchell would not have served to elucidate the 
issues. Defendant did not show that she was in a position to 
perceive and recall the statements made by Ms. Finken or that her 
statements would have served to inform the jury. It is as likely 
as not that her statements would have served to reinforce the 
testimony of Ms. Finken. 
Because defendant did not adequately preserve the 
record in this case by demonstrating either that the witness was 
peculiarly within the power of the State to produce or that the 
testimony would serve to elucidate the transaction, his argument 
must fail. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
DEFENDANT'S GUILT OF EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
establish his guilt of exploiting prostitution. The standard of 
review has previously been defined by this Court and the Utah 
Supreme Court for claims of insufficiency of the evidence. An 
appellate court accords great deference to the jury verdict. It 
is exclusively the function of the jury to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of the witnesses. "The Court should 
only interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
-15-
that reasonable men could not possibly have reached a verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d 410, 412 
(Utah App. 1987), quoting State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 
1980) . 
The defendant has the burden of establishing "that the 
evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that th€> defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 284 (Utah 
1985), quoting State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). 
All evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence 
should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. When the evidence is so viewed, the Court reverses only 
when the evidence is so inconclusive or inherently improbable 
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
concerning the defendant's guilt. State v. One 1982 Silver Honda 
Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392 (Utah App. 1987), citing State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985). This Court has succinctly 
stated that unless there is a clear showing of a lack of 
evidence, the jury verdict will be upheld. Gabaldon, 735 P.2d at 
412. See also State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah 1977). 
A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he 
•'[e]ncourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to 
become or remain a prostitute . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1305(1)(b) (1978). A person engages in prostitution when the 
person "engages or offers or agrees to engage in any sexual 
activity with another for a fee." Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-
1302(1)(a) (1978). Sexual activity includes "masturbation, 
sexual intercourse, or any sexual act involving the genitals of 
one person and the mouth or anus of another person, regardless of 
the sex of either participant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4) 
(Supp. 1987) . 
Ms. Finken was employed by defendant at Aziza Escorts 
(T. A-17). She was told initially that she was not to engage in 
illegal behavior, which included touching of private areas (T. A-
17). Ms. Finken described the details of four incidents in which 
she engaged in sexual activity with men. The first incident 
involved meeting a businessman at his office where she modeled 
lingerie for him and he required her to masturbate him (T. A-18-
19). The second incident involved meeting a man at a motel; he 
had her lay on the bed with him while he rubbed his penis between 
her legs until he ejaculated (T. A-26). The third incident was 
again at a motel room where the wheelchair bound client had her 
lay with him on the bed while he touched her and rubbed his 
genitals against her (T. A29-30). The fourth incident she 
described involved going to a client's home in the avenues where 
she modeled lingerie for an intoxicated man and then lay with him 
on the bed where they engaged in hugging and kissing (T. A-33-
34). 
Each time Ms. Finken returned to defendant's home, she 
informed him of what had occurred (T. A-22-24, 27, 31-32). In 
response, he told her that the customers were "special" and that 
this type of behavior on her part was "expected." Of the $100 
per hour that Ms. Finken earned, defendant kept $55; on some 
occasions, he kept the entire amount ostensibly to pay for her 
escort license (T. A-22, 29-30, 35). 
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The only evidence in contravention to Ms. Finken's 
testimony was elicited during cross-examination during which she 
admitted that in a statement to the detective she had made a few 
statements that were inconsistent with her trial testimony. 
Specifically, she stated that she had not complained to defendant 
about the sexual activity involved because complaints to 
defendant were taboo (T. A-58). She also related only the 
details of the first incident, and said there was no other sexual 
activity (T. A-63). 
However, Ms. Finken stated that she had had time to 
reflect upon the incident since her statement to Detective 
Campbell (T. A-64). She stated that her trial testimony given 
under oath was the truth, and that she had indeed complained to 
and informed defendant of the sexual activity requested by the 
clients but defendant informed her that the clients were special 
and that she was required to do what they pleased (T. A-64). 
When applying the standard of review in this case, it 
is clear that the evidence was sufficient to establish 
defendant's guilt of exploiting prostitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant, Ahab Mustapha Aly, was properly 
convicted of exploiting prostitution. For the foregoing reasons 
and any additional reasons advanced at oral argument, the State 
of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
I B£JF!BARA BEARNS6N 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, 
to Joan C. Watt, attorney for defendant, 424 East 500 South, 
Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on this ({/ day of 
April, 1989. 
